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Assent Uber Alles: Enforcing
Browsewrap Agreements in
Smartphone Applications
1

Emma F. Duke*
I. INTRODUCTION
When a smartphone user browses a website or downloads a new
application (app), the user will most likely be met by a pop-up or
hyperlink providing the infamous “terms and conditions.”2 How many
users click and explore the terms and conditions posed by the website or
app before clicking “I Agree” and continuing on?3 Unbeknownst to most
users, the terms contained within that seemingly insignificant link can
have long-standing consequences if litigation were to arise.
The terms and conditions hyperlink a smartphone user often sees
when signing on to an app is called, in the world on internet contracts, a
browsewrap agreement (browsewrap(s)).4 To determine the
enforceability of browsewraps, courts consider whether the terms and
*To Professor Judd Sneirson: your assistance and encouragement in the drafting process
of this Casenote was invaluable. Thank you for your time and affirmation. To my mother,
Tamsen Beasley: your love and encouragement throughout my life and law school mean
more to me than words can express. Thank you for being my cornerstone.
1. “Uber Alles” is German for “above all.” When courts consider the validity and
enforceability of browsewrap agreements, finding assent by the user is paramount.
2. As the use of electronic commerce has increased, online contracts are frequently
utilized to govern transactions and the use of websites and smartphone applications. Two
principle means of internet contracting are known as “clickwrap” and “browsewrap”
agreements. See 1 Computer Contracts § 2.06 (2021). The enforcement of browsewrap
agreements and the process by which courts analyze the validity of a browsewrap
agreement is the central focus of this Casenote.
3. See Caroline Cakebread, You’re Not Alone, No One Reads Terms of Service
Agreements,
BUSINESS
INSIDER
(Nov.
15,
2017,
7:30
AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/deloitte-study-91-percent-agree-terms-of-servicewithout-reading-2017-11?utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=referral&utm_content=topbar.
4. 1 Computer Contracts § 1.02(c) (2021).
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conditions are reasonably conspicuous and whether the user, while on
notice of the terms, continues using the app.5 These two elements—
conspicuous terms and continued use—are critical to support a finding
that a browsewrap agreement and its terms are enforceable against a
user.
The enforceability of a browsewrap imbedded in a smartphone app
came before the Georgia Court of Appeals in May 2021 as an issue of
first impression in Thornton v. Uber Technologies, Inc.6 Relying on the
reasoning of the United States Court of Appeals for the First and
Second Circuits regarding the enforceability of browsewrap agreements,
the Georgia Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s order compelling
arbitration and held that the lower court erred by finding Thornton
assented to the hyperlinked terms as a matter of law.7
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In February 2018, Ryan Thornton was murdered by a driver working
for Uber Technologies, Inc.,8 (Uber).9 The decedent’s mother later filed a
lawsuit against Uber, claiming wrongful death and negligence. This
case came before the Georgia Court of Appeals on an interlocutory
appeal by the Plaintiff after the trial court granted a motion to compel
arbitration in favor of Uber. On appeal, the Plaintiff argued Thornton
never assented to the terms and conditions presented by Uber, and thus
he did not agree to the arbitration clause Uber sought to enforce.10
To use the services offered by Uber, a user must first create and
register an account through Uber’s smartphone app and enter their
payment information.11 Thornton created his account with Uber using
the Uber app on his Android smartphone on May 15, 2016. When
creating an account in the Uber app, a user is first brought to a screen
to input contact information and create a password for the account.

5. This is the two-step analysis courts typically apply to determine the enforceability
of browsewraps. See Meyer v. Uber Techs., Inc., 868 F.3d 66, 77–80 (2d Cir. 2017) (holding
a browsewrap agreement to be enforceable against the smartphone user after applying
this two-step analysis).
6. 359 Ga. App. 790, 793, 858 S.E.2d 255, 258 (2021).
7. Id. at 791, 858 S.E.2d at 257.
8. Uber Technologies, Inc. is a ride-sharing technology company with software
applications for transportation and food delivery service. See UBER, https://www.uber.com/
(last visited Nov. 17, 2021).
9. Thornton, 359 Ga. App. at 790, 858 S.E.2d at 257.
10. Id. at 790–91, 858 S.E.2d at 257.
11. Id. at 791, 858 S.E.2d at 257.
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Then, the user is guided to the payment screen to complete his
registration.12
At the bottom of this payment screen on the version of the Uber app
Thornton used was the following language in dark gray, uppercase text:
“BY CREATING AN UBER ACCOUNT, YOU AGREE TO OUR TERMS
& CONDITIONS AND PRIVACY POLICY.”13 While in a small font, the
dark gray text stood out on a bright white background and the phrase
“TERMS & CONDITIONS AND PRIVACY POLICY” were in blue and
underlined, indicating a hyperlink. If this phrase was clicked, the
hyperlink would direct the user to another webpage presenting Uber’s
full terms and conditions for use of its services. These terms and
conditions contained the arbitration agreement at issue in the present
case.14
On the payment screen in the Uber app during the registration
process, the user may enter his credit card information or click a button
to link to a PayPal account.15 If a user on an Android device clicked on
the information field to enter his credit card information, an on-screen
keyboard would rise from the bottom of the screen to allow the user to
input the information. During registration on his Android, Thornton
elected to enter his credit card information for his payment method.
When this on-screen keyboard rises, the keys cover the bottom portion
of the screen—including the hyperlinked terms and conditions.16
After registering his account, Thornton used Uber’s services
beginning in July 2016.17 Uber in an affidavit asserted that in
November 2016, Thornton was sent an email from Uber providing an
updated version of the terms and conditions. This new version
contained updates to portions of the arbitration agreement. After
November 2016, Thornton continued using Uber’s services.18
After Thornton was murdered by his Uber driver in 2018, Thornton’s
mother filed suit in Dekalb County State Court.19 Uber filed a motion to
dismiss and a motion to compel arbitration, seeking the enforcement of
the arbitration clause contained in the terms and conditions presented
in the app during Thornton’s registration and in the November 2016
email. The trial court granted Uber’s motion and ordered the parties to

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. at 792, 858 S.E.2d at 257.
Id. at 791, 858 S.E.2d at 257.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 792, 858 S.E.2d at 257.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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arbitrate upon a finding that Thornton assented to Uber’s terms and
conditions.20
On interlocutory appeal, the question of assent to the terms of a
contract on a smartphone app presented an issue of first impression for
the Georgia Court of Appeals.21 The court ultimately agreed with the
Plaintiff, holding that the trial court erred as a matter of law in its
finding that Thornton assented to Uber’s terms and conditions.22
However, the court declined to hold that the terms and conditions were
so inconspicuous that, as a matter of law, Thornton could not have
assented to the terms.23 Rather, it determined that a question of fact
remained as to whether the pop-up, on-screen keyboard concealed the
terms and conditions such that Thornton did not have an opportunity to
see or access the terms. Thus, Thornton could not have assented to the
terms.24
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Internet Contracts
A contract can be established over the Internet through a variety of
methods, and each methodology involves a different manifestation of
assent. Two of the most common methods are “clickwrap” and
“browsewrap” agreements.25 Clickwraps entail a presentation of the
terms and conditions to the user and a button containing a phrase such
as “I Agree” or “I Accept.”26 Similarly, there are “scrollwraps,” in which
the user must physically scroll through the terms in their entirety and
then click an “I agree” button before moving forward.27 For clickwraps
and scrollwraps, when the user clicks the “I Agree” button, the user

20. Id. at 792, 858 S.E.2d at 257–58.
21. Id. at 793, 858 S.E.2d at 258.
22. Id. at 792, 858 S.E.2d at 258.
23. Id. at 793, 858 S.E.2d at 258.
24. Id. at 792, 858 S.E.2d at 258.
25. Internet agreements do not always fall squarely into the clickwrap or browsewrap
categorization but rather may contain characteristics of both. See Kurtis A. Kemper,
Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Browsewrap Agreements, 95 A.L.R.
6th 57, *3 (2014). These agreements evolve as technology progresses, therefore creating
change in the legal categorization of the agreements. For example, in Berkson v. Gogo
LLC, Judge Weinstein coined the term “sign-in wrap” for agreements that fall between
browsewraps and clickwraps. 97 F. Supp. 3d 359, 366 (E.D.N.Y 2015).
26. 1 Computer Contracts § 1.02(b) (2021).
27. 1 Computer Contracts § 1.02(e) (2021).
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expressly manifests his assent to the terms and conditions and a
contract is formed.28
Then there are browsewraps. To establish a browsewrap agreement,
the terms and conditions governing use of the site are displayed on the
webpage, typically using a hyperlink that connects the user to another
page containing the agreement in its entirety.29 For browsewrap
agreements, the user is said to exhibit assent through continued use of
the website or application, as long as the user has actual or constructive
knowledge of the terms and conditions provided by and through the
hyperlink.30 This continued use amounts to a manifestation of assent
once the user is on notice of the terms; the user does not have to
otherwise provide an express, affirmative act to manifest assent.31
Because of the difference in manifestation of assent in these different
types of internet contracts, courts consider issues regarding assent to
browsewrap agreements in a unique manner.
B. Evaluating the Validity of Internet Contracts
Internet contracts are analyzed using general principles of contract
law, just like written contracts.32 Central to contract law in Georgia is
the principle that mutual assent by the parties is required to create a
binding, enforceable contract.33 To determine whether there was mutual
assent by the contracting parties, courts apply the objective theory of
intent, whereby “one party’s intention is deemed to be that meaning a
reasonable man in the position of the other contracting party would
ascribe to the first party’s manifestations of assent, or that meaning
which the other contracting party knew the first party ascribed to his
manifestations of assent.”34 Relevant to finding mutual assent is
evidence of the circumstances surrounding the formation of the

28. 1 Computer Contracts § 1.02(b).
29. Kemper, supra note 25, at *2.
30. Id.
31. Id.; Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1176 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[A]
browsewrap agreement does not require the user to manifest assent to the terms and
conditions expressly . . . [a] party instead gives his assent simply by using the website.”).
32. See Register.com Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 403 (2nd Cir. 2004) (“While new
commerce on the Internet has exposed courts to many new situations, it has not
fundamentally changed the principles of contract.”); Ajemian v. Yahoo!, Inc., 987 N.E.2d
604, 612 (Mass. App. Ct. 2013) (reasoning there was “no reason to apply different legal
principles simply because a forum selection or limitations clause [was placed] in an online
contract.”).
33. See O.C.G.A § 13-3-2 (1933).
34. Turner Broadcasting System v. McDavid, 303 Ga. App. 593, 597, 693 S.E.2d 873,
878 (2010).
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contract, including communications between the two parties.35 Lastly,
like with traditional, written contracts, the “duty to read” principle
applies to internet contracts.36 When a person who can read signs a
contract without apprising himself of the contents, the failure to read
generally does not excuse the party from the terms contained therein.37
These traditional principles govern the construction and
enforceability of internet contracts as well. In evaluating whether an
arbitration clause in an internet contract created though a browsewrap
agreement is binding and enforceable, courts apply state contract law
on traditional contract formation.38 However, the application of such
principles to internet contracts has been an issue of first impression for
many courts, prompting the development of a new framework specific to
browsewrap agreements to determine enforceability.39
1. Enforcement of Browsewrap Agreements
Since the rise of internet contracts has occurred in only the past two
decades, it is a relatively new area of case law, and courts are still
developing the legal framework to test the enforceability of browsewrap
agreements. While it remains an evolving area of law, over time courts
have developed a two-step analysis to evaluate the enforceability of
browsewraps.40 The first step assesses the communication of the terms
to the user(s), which hinges on the conspicuousness of the terms.41 The
second step evaluates the manifestation of assent, which involves the
notice given to the user and his continued use of the website or app.42
In the development of this framework, courts have created the
“reasonably prudent smartphone user” standard.43 To determine the
enforceability of a clause in a browsewrap agreement, courts consider
35. Id. at 597, 693 S.E.2d at 878.
36. See Lovelace v. Figure Salon, 179 Ga. App. 51, 53, 345 S.E.2d 139, 141 (1986)
(“One who can read, must read.”) (citing Cochran v. Murrah, 235 Ga. 304, 305, 219 S.E.2d
421, 423 (1975)).
37. Lovelace, 179 Ga. App. at 53, 345 S.E.2d at 141.
38. First Options of Chi, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995).
39. 1 Computer Contracts § 1.02(c) (“Despite their ubiquity, browsewrap agreements
are still relatively new to courts.”).
40. Cullinane v. Uber Technologies, Inc., 893 F.3d 53, 61–62 (1st Cir. 2018).
41. Id. at 62; See also Defontes v. Dell Computers Corp., C.A. No. PC 03-2636, 2004
R.I. Super. LEXIS 32, *17 (R.I. Super. 2004) (holding a browsewrap agreement to be
unenforceable when it failed to be conspicuous such that customers would be on notice of
the terms and conditions).
42. Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 62.
43. Meyer, 868 F.3d at 77 (“In considering the question of reasonable
conspicuousness, . . . we consider the perspective of a reasonably prudent smartphone
user.”); See also Specht v. Netscape Communs. Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 30 (2d Cir. 2002).
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whether the hyperlinked terms and conditions are reasonably
conspicuous such that a reasonably prudent smartphone user would
have constructive notice of those terms.44 The primary factors courts
consider when evaluating reasonable conspicuousness include the
placement of the terms, regarding both the context and physical
location on the app’s interface;45 the timing, such as duration the link is
displayed; font size and color;46 language and phrasing; and whether
the terms are attention-grabbing relative to the rest of the features on
the screen.47 These factors have proven to be crucial in finding
browsewraps enforceable.
i. Browsewrap Agreements Held to Be Enforceable
Several courts applying this framework have found that a user
assented to terms in a browsewrap located in a smartphone app. In
Meyer v. Uber Technologies, Inc.48, the Second Circuit found the terms
and conditions contained in the Uber app registration page were
sufficiently conspicuous such that the user had constructive notice of
the terms upon registration.49 Given this constructive notice, the user
effectively assented to the terms contained in the hyperlinked
agreement by completing the registration and continuing use of the
app.50
To reach this holding, the court considered whether a reasonably
prudent smartphone user would have constructive notice of the terms
and conditions on the interface of the Uber app during registration.51
The court reasoned that a reasonably prudent smartphone user would
have constructive notice of the terms if the terms were reasonably
conspicuous.52 The reasonably conspicuous standard involves the terms
having certain qualities and characteristics to communicate to the user

44. Meyer, 868 F.3d at 79.
45. Nguyen, 763 F.3d at 1177 (“Where the link to a website’s terms of use is buried at
the bottom of the page or tucked away in obscure corners of the website where users are
unlikely to see it, courts have refused to enforce the browsewrap agreement.”).
46. The color of the hyperlink is particularly important to indicate the terms and
conditions are linked. Meyer, 868 F.3d at 77–78 (“[A] reasonably prudent smartphone user
knows that text that is highlighted in blue and underlined is hyperlinked to another
webpage where additional information will be found.”).
47. Id. at 78 (holding a browsewrap agreement enforceable when the terms and
conditions appeared in a dark print on a white, uncluttered background screen).
48. 868 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 2017).
49. Id. at 79.
50. Id. at 79–80.
51. Id. at 77.
52. Id.
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that (1) the full terms and conditions are available through the
hyperlink and (2) registration and use of the goods or services is subject
to these terms and conditions, and these terms could impact the user in
the future.53 The browsewrap in Meyer satisfied this standard.54
In Meyer, the app interface containing the browsewrap in question
was a clear, uncluttered screen during the account registration
process.55 At the bottom of the screen was the following language: “[B]y
creating an Uber account, you agree to the TERMS OF SERVICE &
PRIVACY POLICY.”56 The user did not have to scroll to see this notice;
it was visible for the user once he entered this stage of registration in
the app. Of importance here, the language “TERMS OF SERVICE &
PRIVACY POLICY” appeared in blue with underlined text, indicating a
hyperlink.57 The full phrase appeared in small but dark print against a
bright white background, creating a stark contrast which grabbed the
user’s attention.58
As a result, the Second Circuit determined that this presentation of
the terms was reasonably conspicuous such that a reasonably prudent
smartphone user would recognize the hyperlink as connected to account
registration.59 The hyperlink was recognizable as such due to the
distinctive blue, underlined text. The screen was not cluttered with
other distracting terms that could have prevented the user from
noticing the terms at the bottom of the screen. Further, the placement
of the browsewrap occurred at the point where the user officially
registered his account.60 Based on these critical findings, the court
reasoned that a reasonably prudent smartphone user would understand
the hyperlink gave notice that account registration would be contingent
upon certain hyperlinked terms and conditions.61 This provided the
constructive notice sufficient to find the user assented to the terms.62
Likewise, if the hyperlink containing the terms and conditions is
presented conspicuously on each page of a website, continued use of the
website or application is sufficient to show the user assented to the

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 78–80.
Id. at 80.
Id. at 78.
Id. at 71.
Id.
Id. at 78.
Id. at 79–80.
Id. at 78–79.
Id. at 78.
Id. at 79–80.
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terms. In Cairo, Inc. v. Crossmedia Services, Inc.,63 the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California enforced the
contract terms where each page on the website had a textual notice that
read: “By continuing past this page and/or using this site, you agree to
abide by the Terms of Use for this site, which prohibit commercial use
of any information on this site.”64 This explicit notice that continued use
constituted assent to the terms made the court more amenable to
enforcing the browsewrap.65 Further, the phrase “Terms of Use” was
clearly hyperlinked, signaling to the user that the terms could be
accessed by clicking the link.66
The conspicuous display of the hyperlinked terms and a clear signal
that continued use will constitute acceptance are two findings that are
crucial to find a valid browsewrap agreement. If the terms are
inconspicuously displayed, this will almost certainly destroy the validity
of the browsewrap.
ii. Browsewrap Agreements Held to Be Unenforceable
Other courts deciding issues involving the enforceability of
browsewrap agreements have found these contracts to be
unenforceable. In Cullinane v. Uber Technologies, Inc.,67 the First
Circuit held that the terms and conditions in the Uber app interface at
issue were not reasonably conspicuous, and the Plaintiffs did not assent
to the terms when the hyperlink did not include the common
characteristics of a hyperlink (blue, underlined text), and failed to stand
out relative to other terms on the same screen.68 The language
presenting notice of the terms and the hyperlink were in large, bold font
contained in a gray, rectangular box at the bottom of the registration
screen.69 However, there were additional features on the screen which
were displayed with large font and with equally, if not more, noticeable
and attention-grabbing attributes. The court reasoned that having such
similar terms and features elsewhere on the screen “diminished the
conspicuousness” of the terms and conditions Uber sought to include.70

63. No. C-04-04825-JW, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8450, *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2005).
64. Id. at *4 (emphasis in original).
65. Id. at *13–14.
66. Id. at *4.
67. 893 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 2018).
68. Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 63–64. The enforceability of this internet contract and
whether the app user assented to the terms was an issue of first impression for the court.
69. Id. at 62–63.
70. Id. at 63.
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That is, courts do not view the disputed browsewrap in a vacuum
separate from the rest of the screen the user would view.71
In the court’s finding that the terms presented by Uber were not
reasonably conspicuous and the Plaintiffs did not provide unambiguous
assent to the terms, the Cullinane court heavily emphasized the
detrimental effect of the hyperlink’s appearance on the browsewrap’s
enforceability.72 How prominently this link is displayed is a key factor
in determining the browsewrap’s enforceability.73 If the hyperlink is not
presented in the traditional format with blue, underlined text, it is less
likely that the court will conclude that a reasonably prudent
smartphone user would have notice of the terms signaled by the link.74
Moreover, when the link to the terms and conditions is buried or
hidden at the bottom of a website or app screen where it would be
difficult for the user to notice the link, courts are unlikely to find the
user assented to the terms.75 In Specht v. Netscape Communications
Corp.,76 the Second Circuit refused to enforce a browsewrap agreement
when the link was placed at the bottom of a website’s screen far below a
“download” button users would click.77 The court reasoned that the
user—downloading a free software application—had no reason to know
about a license agreement contained within the terms when the link
was located at the bottom of the screen away from the download
button.78
Taking an even stricter approach on browsewrap enforceability, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Nguyen v.

71. Id.
72. Id. at 64. Interestingly, the court critiqued, almost as an aside, Uber’s choice to
utilize a browsewrap agreement as opposed to a clickwrap agreement, where the user
would have to physically click “I Agree” before moving past the terms and continuing to
register for the service. While binding contracts may be made and enforced through
browsewrap agreements, the court’s reasoning suggests electing to use a clickwrap
agreement, which garners the express assent of the user, would be a safer and more
effective approach to establishing internet contracts. But see Meyer, 868 F.3d at 78 (“That
the Terms of Service were available only by hyperlink does not preclude a determination
of reasonable notice.”).
73. See Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 64.
74. Id. at 63 (holding a browsewrap agreement to be unenforceable when the
hyperlink appeared in a gray, rectangular box and did not have the common blue,
underlined style of a hyperlink).
75. Nguyen, 763 F.3d at 1177; In re Zappos, Inc., 893 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1064 (D. Nev.
2012); Hines v. Overstock.com, Inc., 380 F. App’x. 22, 24–25 (2d Cir. 2010); Specht, 306
F.3d at 31–32.
76. 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002).
77. Specht, 306 F.3d at 20.
78. Id.
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Barnes & Noble Inc.79 held a browsewrap on a website was
unenforceable when, although there was a conspicuous hyperlink
provided on every page of the website, there was otherwise no notice
provided to the user of binding terms nor a prompt for the user to take
affirmative action to assent to terms.80 In Nguyen, there was relatively
close proximity between the hyperlink and the buttons a user would
click to complete his purchase.81 However, the court reasoned that this
proximity was insufficient to place the user on notice of the terms
because “[g]iven the breadth of the range of technological savvy of
online purchasers, consumers cannot be expected to ferret out
hyperlinks to terms and conditions to which they have no reason to
suspect they will be bound.”82
While browsewraps still pose new and frequently evolving questions
of enforceability to the courts, there are general principles that guide
courts in framing and evaluating browsewrap agreements.
2. Guiding Principles for Valid Browsewrap Agreements
The key principle in the enforcement of browsewrap agreements is
that the terms must be reasonably conspicuous such that a user would
have actual or constructive knowledge of the terms.83 If objective,
reasonable notice of the terms is impressed upon the smartphone user,
courts have found that the user need not expressly assent to the terms
or the arbitration agreement contained therein.84 A court may still
consider the user’s assent as unambiguous, allowing for enforcement of
the agreement, when the user is sufficiently put on constructive notice
through the presentation of the terms on the app’s interface and the
user continues using the website or app.85
Further, if the terms are presented in a proper, conspicuous manner,
then a reasonably prudent smartphone user would understand that, by
following through with registration, his registration is subject to the

79. 763 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2014).
80. Id. at 1177–79.
81. Id. at 1177.
82. Id. at 1179.
83. Hines, 380 F. App’x at 25 (affirming the district court’s denial of defendant’s
motion to compel arbitration when the defendant failed to show the plaintiffs had actual
or constructive knowledge of the terms, which were displayed in a browsewrap agreement
format).
84. Meyer, 868 F.3d at 74–75 (“Browsewrap agreements . . . do not require the user to
expressly assent.”). This is reinforced by the principle that when a party fails to read the
contract terms to which he assents, his failure to read is not a defense. See Lovelace, 179
Ga. App. at 53, 345 S.E.2d at 141.
85. See e.g., Meyer, 868 F.3d at 79.
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hyperlinked terms and conditions—regardless of whether the user
clicks on the hyperlink or not.86 This reasonably conspicuous notice—
imparting constructive notice to the user, leading to unambiguous
manifestation of assent through use of the app—is the finding a court
must make to render the browsewrap agreement and the clauses
contained within as valid and enforceable.87 As the Second Circuit has
reasoned when examining browsewrap enforceability, “[r]easonably
conspicuous notice of the existence of contract terms and unambiguous
manifestation of assent to those terms by consumers are essential if
electronic bargaining is to have integrity and credibility.”88 This
framework courts have developed to analyze browsewraps provides a
standard ensuring mutual assent—an axiomatic and integral element
of contract law.
IV. COURT’S RATIONALE
Whether Thornton assented to Uber’s terms and conditions
associated with the app presented an issue of first impression before the
Georgia Court of Appeals.89 The Thornton court ultimately followed the
First and Second Circuit court’s reasoning, focusing on whether Uber’s
hyperlinked terms were conspicuous and gave Thornton notice of the
terms. In holding that the trial court erred in finding Thornton agreed
to the hyperlinked terms during his registration and continued use, the
court issued a significant holding for companies utilizing smartphone
apps in Georgia: inconspicuous terms and conditions will likely preclude
a finding that the user assented to the terms as a matter of law.90
A. Assent to the Terms During Account Registration
Applying the Second Circuit’s reasonably prudent smartphone user
standard put forth in Meyer, the Thornton court examined the link to
the terms and conditions provided in the Uber app used by Thornton to
determine whether there was sufficient notice.91 Similar to Meyer, the

86. Wilson v. Huuuge, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 3d 1308, 1316 (W.D. Wash. 2018) (reasoning
that a key determination in browsewrap enforceability is whether the app adequately
informs a reasonably prudent user that clicking to register includes agreeing to be bound
by the hyperlinked terms).
87. Temple v. Best Rate Holdings LLC, 360 F. Supp. 3d 1289, 1302 (M.D. Fla. 2018)
(holding that the validity of the browsewrap agreement turns on whether the website puts
a reasonably prudent user on inquiry notice).
88. Specht, 306 F.3d at 35.
89. Thornton, 359 Ga. App. at 793, 858 S.E.2d at 258.
90. Id. at 794, 858 S.E.2d at 259.
91. Id. at 793–94, 858 S.E.2d at 258–59.
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use of dark font on a bright white background created contrast that
draws the user’s notice.92 Uber crafted the language in uppercase text,
with the phrase “TERMS & CONDITIONS AND PRIVACY POLICY”
hyperlinked.93 The court held this hyperlink satisfied the common
appearance of a hyperlink, such that the user would understand it is
linked to another webpage, because the phrase was in blue, underlined
text.94 The court concluded—based on this presentation of the terms
and conditions—that Thornton could have been found to have assented
to Uber’s terms and conditions upon registering his account, regardless
of whether he clicked the hyperlink.95
Since a party is still bound by the duty to read, any failure to click on
the hyperlink to access the full agreement does not excuse the party
from the obligations contained therein, including any arbitration
agreement.96 Under this theory and that of the objective standard of
assent, the court reasoned Thornton certainly could have been found to
have assented to the terms. However, the decisive factor that shifted
the court’s holding was the evidence regarding the potential
concealment of the terms and conditions hyperlink on the Android
interface of the Uber app that Thornton used.97
The interface of the Uber app on Thornton’s Android included an
on-screen keyboard that appeared on the bottom of the screen below the
payment information.98 If this keyboard covered the terms and
conditions language and hyperlink at the bottom of the screen, this
would be problematic in finding Thornton assented to the terms.
Drawing from Georgia’s objective theory of intent, the court reasoned
that if the interface of the app was such that Thornton might not have
seen the terms and conditions or had the opportunity to click the
hyperlink, then he might not have assented to Uber’s terms and
conditions.99 The court held that this could be the case if the terms and
conditions were hidden entirely by the on-screen keyboard, or if the
terms were displayed for an unreasonably short period of time,
hindering Thornton from taking notice of the language.100

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 794, 858 S.E.2d at 259; Meyer, 868 F.3d at 71.
Thornton, 359 Ga. App. at 794, 858 S.E.2d at 259.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at 794–95, 858 S.E.2d at 259.
Id. at 792, 858 S.E.2d at 257.
Id. at 794–95, 858 S.E.2d at 259.
Id.
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B. Assent to the Terms Through the Email Update
In addition to the browsewrap presented during registration, an
email was sent by Uber to users later to apprise users of updated terms
and conditions.101 Uber argued that Thornton assented to the terms
through his continued use of the app after the email was sent from
Uber containing updated terms and conditions.102 However, Uber could
not present specific evidence showing Thornton’s email address as a
recipient.103
In response, the court concluded that—since there was a question of
fact regarding whether Thornton received this update—the email
update and Thornton’s continued use of the app did not constitute
assent.104 The court’s decision to withhold assuming receipt of the email
by Thornton highlights an important distinction in Georgia law and
illustrates why parties may not want to rely on the mailbox rule.105
Georgia courts have not extended the assumption of delivery under the
mailbox rule to communications including telegram or email. Therefore,
evidence of Uber’s updated terms and conditions email, without
Thornton’s specific email address, was insufficient to show Thornton
received the email.106
The court of appeal’s holding regarding the browsewrap’s lack of
enforceability will remain intact and authoritative for app developers
and consumers in Georgia—reconsideration for this appeal was denied
on June 16, 2021, and certiorari was denied on October 5, 2021.107
V. IMPLICATIONS
The use of smartphone apps to buy and sell goods and services has
become widespread in the modern economy, and the use of this
technological tool will only increase in the future. While companies
using smartphone apps to market and sell goods or services enjoy the
benefits of more efficient business transactions and access to a wider
consumer base, companies should exercise caution in the presentation
of the terms and conditions to minimize costly disputes in the future. A

101. Id. at 796, 858 S.E.2d at 260.
102. Id. at 795, 858 S.E.2d at 259.
103. Id. at 796, 858 S.E.2d at 260.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 796 n.2, 858 S.E.2d at 260 (“Georgia courts have not applied any
presumption of delivery or receipt to other forms of communication, such as telegram or email.”).
106. Id. at 796, 858 S.E.2d at 260.
107. Id. at 790, 858 S.E.2d at 255.
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frequent point of contention involved in these disputes is the use of an
arbitration clause.
The party seeking to compel arbitration bears the burden of showing
a written agreement to arbitrate exists.108 Given this burden and the
standard courts apply to terms and conditions incorporated within a
mobile app, companies using such smartphone apps should take a more
cautious, thorough approach in garnering the assent of the user
through careful display of the terms.
Companies should present terms and conditions as clear as possible
on the websites or smartphone apps it utilizes. This includes presenting
the terms in a text designed to be eye-catching and attention-grabbing.
This includes contrast, such as dark text on a bright white background;
proper hyperlinks with blue, underlined text; and minimal distractions
elsewhere on the page where the terms are presented.
Furthermore, companies may find it advantageous to use a clickwrap
agreement to present the terms and conditions as opposed to a
browsewrap agreement.109 Using a method like clickwraps, which
require an affirmative act by the user in clicking “I Accept” or “I Agree,”
is likely a more effective, reliable manner of garnering the assent of the
user to the terms.110 The more definite manifestation of assent that
comes with a physical expression is a safer choice for companies and
minimizes the risk of a finding in future disputes that the user never
assented to the terms.111 Likewise, additional low-risk options include
requiring the user’s signature or providing an email verification that
the user assented to the terms.112
However, companies should not rely solely on sending later emails
updating the terms and conditions to establish the user’s assent to the
terms. Evidence of receipt is necessary to enforce the updated
agreement against the user, and a lack of such documentation could
prove costly for a party seeking to enforce the contract. This should
inspire careful action by companies using smartphone apps and
websites to garner assent from the initial use rather than solely rely on
108. Ashburn Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Poole, 286 Ga. App. 24, 25, 648 S.E.2d 430, 432
(2007).
109. See Nguyen, 763 F.3d at 1176 (“Were there any evidence in the record that
Nguyen had actual notice of the Terms of Use or was required to affirmatively
acknowledge the Terms of Use before completing his online purchase, the outcome of this
case might be different.”).
110. Id. at 1176–77.
111. Berkson, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 397 (finding that the active role a user plays in
assenting to a clickwrap agreement makes these agreements generally enforceable by the
courts).
112. Id. at 403.
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future communication. Ultimately, while companies may successfully
utilize browsewraps to form a binding contract from the initial use of
the website or app, the alternative methods requiring a physical
manifestation of assent by the user may prove to be a lower risk option.

